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Abstract
Intuitively, it is clear that trust or shared taste enables a community of users to make better decisions over time, by learning
cooperatively and avoiding one another’s mistakes. However, it is also clear that the presence of malicious, dishonest users in the
community threatens the usefulness of such collaborative learning processes. We investigate this issue by developing algorithms
for a multi-user online learning problem in which each user makes a sequence of decisions about selecting products or resources.
Our model, which generalizes the adversarial multi-armed bandit problem, is characterized by two key features:
(1) The quality of the products or resources may vary over time.
(2) Some of the users in the system may be dishonest, Byzantine agents.
Decision problems with these features underlie applications such as reputation and recommendation systems in e-commerce, and
resource location systems in peer-to-peer networks. Assuming the number of honest users is at least a constant fraction of the
number of resources, and that the honest users can be partitioned into groups such that individuals in a group make identical
assessments of resources, we present an algorithm whose expected regret per user is linear in the number of groups and only
logarithmic in the number of resources. This bound compares favorably with the naïve approach in which each user ignores
feedback from peers and chooses resources using a multi-armed bandit algorithm; in this case the expected regret per user would
be polynomial in the number of resources.
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Only a fool learns from his own mistakes. The wise man learns from the mistakes of others.
— Otto von Bismarck
It is clear that leveraging trust or shared taste enables a community of users to be more productive, as it allows
them to repeat each other’s good decisions while avoiding unnecessary repetition of mistakes. Systems based on this
paradigm are becoming increasingly prevalent in computer networks and the applications they support. Examples in-
clude reputation systems in e-commerce (e.g. eBay, where buyers and sellers rank each other), collaborative filtering
(e.g. Amazon’s recommendation system, where customers recommend books to other customers), and link analysis
techniques in web search (e.g., Google’s PageRank, based on combining links—i.e. recommendations—of different
web sites). Not surprisingly, many algorithms and heuristics for such systems have been proposed and studied experi-
mentally or phenomenologically [10,17,19,20,23–25]. Yet well-known algorithms (e.g. eBay’s reputation system [11,
15,22], the EigenTrust algorithm [16], the PageRank [10,20] and HITS [17] algorithms for web search) have thus far
not been placed on a firm theoretical foundation.
Our goal in this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the capabilities and limitations of
such systems in an idealized distributed environment. We propose a paradigm for addressing these issues using online
learning theory, specifically a generalization of the adversarial multi-armed bandit problem [2,3]. Our approach aims
to highlight the following challenges which confront the users of collaborative decision-making systems such as those
cited above.
Malicious users. The above systems are vulnerable to fraudulent manipulation by dishonest (“Byzantine”) partici-
pants.
Distinguishing tastes. Agents’ tastes may differ, so that the advice of one honest agent may not be helpful to another.
Temporal fluctuation. The quality of resources varies over time, so past experience is not necessarily predictive of
future performance.
While our learning theory paradigm is different from prior approaches, and the mathematical setting of our problem is
quite distant from the applications listed above, the resulting algorithms exhibit a striking resemblance to algorithms
previously proposed in the systems and information retrieval literature (e.g. EigenTrust [16]) indicating that our ap-
proach may provide a theoretical framework which sheds light on the efficacy of such algorithms in practice while
suggesting potential enhancements to these algorithms.
1.1. Our approach
The problem we will consider is a generalization of the multi-armed bandit problem studied in [2,3]. In that problem
there is a single learner and a set Y of m resources. In each of T consecutive trials, the learner chooses one of the
resources while the adversary chooses a cost (taking values in [0,1]) for each resource; both the learner and the
adversary commit to their choices without knowledge of the other party’s choice in the present trial. After the trial,
the cost of the resource chosen by the learner is revealed, and that cost is charged to the learner. The goal is to choose
a sequence of resources whose cost performs nearly as well, on average, as the best single resource in hindsight.
We generalize this by considering a set X of n agents, some of which (possibly a majority) may be dishonest. In
each trial, each of the n agents chooses a resource, and the adversary chooses a cost for each resource. Each agent then
learns the cost of the resource it selected, and this cost is charged to the agent. We assume that the honest agents belong
to k coalitions, such that agents in the same coalition who choose the same resource at the same time will perceive the
same expected cost. All agents may communicate with each other between trials, to exchange information (or possibly
disinformation, in the case of dishonest agents) about the costs of resources they have sampled. However, agents are
unaware of which coalitions exist and which ones they belong to. In particular, they are unaware of the identities of
the dishonest agents.
The abstract notion of cost introduced in the preceding paragraph should be interpreted, in the context of most
applications, to mean disutility rather than an actual monetary charge imposed on an agent. For example, if we are
modeling the decision problem faced by consumers shopping on eBay, then the set of agents in this model corresponds
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this type of good. The cost of an agent (buyer) selecting a resource (seller) incorporates the price the buyer paid to the
seller as well as the buyer’s subjective assessment of the disutility incurred by purchasing the product from that seller,
e.g. because of shipping delays or receiving the product in worse condition than advertised. However, many features of
the eBay example do not precisely match the assumptions of our model—for example, the assumption that every agent
participates in every trial is clearly unrealistic in the context of a large, relatively unstructured electronic marketplace—
so one should interpret eBay-style reputation mechanisms as a distant application of the abstract methodology we
develop here.
For an application which matches the details of our problem definition more closely, one may consider the following
restaurant selection problem. A group of travelers (i.e., agents) arrive simultaneously in a city which none of them has
visited before, and they spend several consecutive nights there. The city has many restaurants (i.e., resources), and the
quality (i.e., negative cost) of each restaurant may vary from night to night and may depend on the subjective taste
of the particular diner eating at the restaurant. Each night, each of the agents chooses to eat at one of the restaurants
in the city, judges the quality of that restaurant, and posts his or her opinion (on a scale from 0 to 1) on a public
bulletin board in the hotel where the travelers are staying. A subset of the agents are honest, and these agents can
be partitioned into a small number of coalitions with identical tastes in food. Dishonest agents may post misleading
feedback maliciously. None of the honest agents know who the other honest agents are, nor how they are partitioned
into coalitions. The goal is to optimize the dining experience of the honest agents.
If an agent chooses to ignore the feedback from other agents, and simply runs the multi-armed bandit algorithm by
itself, then the combined regret of all agents (the difference between the costs of their choices and those of the best
choice in hindsight) grows linearly in the number of agents. On the other hand, if each honest agent knew in advance
the identities of the other honest agents, as well as the partition of those agents into coalitions, then it seems reasonable
that the combined regret of all agents should scale linearly in the number of coalitions and not the number of agents.
Here, we show that this is possible (up to a factor of log(n)) even if the agents do not know which other agents are
honest nor how the honest agents are partitioned into coalitions. We present an algorithm whose combined regret is
linear in k log(n), provided that the total number of agents and resources exceeds the number of honest agents by at
most a constant factor.
Briefly, our algorithm works by having each agent select a resource in each trial using a random walk on a “repu-
tation network” whose vertex set is the set of all agents and resources. Resources are absorbing states of this random
walk, while the transition probabilities at an agent x may be interpreted as the probability that x will ask another
agent x′ for advice, or that x will choose a resource y without asking for advice. When an agent learns the cost of the
resource chosen in a given trial, it uses this feedback to update its transition probabilities according to a multi-armed
bandit algorithm. In this way, agents will tend to raise the probability of asking for advice from other agents who
have given good advice in the past. In particular, though the initial transition probabilities do not reflect the partition
of the honest agents into coalitions, over time the honest agents will tend to place greater weight on edges leading to
other agents in the same coalition, since the advice they receive from such agents is generally better (on average) than
the advice they receive from agents in other coalitions. Thus, the transition probabilities of the random walk can be
interpreted as measuring the amount of trust that one agent places in another agent or resource.
An extended abstract of this work [5] appeared at COLT 2005. It is worth pointing out the two most substantial
differences between that extended abstract and this paper. First, the algorithm in the earlier paper [5] depended on a
complicated subroutine called the “biased bandit algorithm” (BBA), a version of the multi-armed bandit algorithm
which was specifically designed for its use in the collaborative learning setting. Here, instead, we use a simpler
algorithm called the “anytime bandit algorithm” (ABA), which was developed by Kleinberg in a later paper [18]
that introduced multi-armed bandit algorithms which outperform the standard algorithm [2,3] when near-optimal
strategies are highly prevalent among the set of all strategies. Our use of the ABA algorithm not only simplifies
the description of the collaborative learning algorithm, but it also improves the bound on the expected regret per
honest user: the dependence of the regret on log(n) is improved from O(log4(n)) to O(log(n)). A second difference
between this paper and the extended abstract [5] is that the extended abstract assumes that agents can communicate
between rounds using a shared public channel. If communication instead takes place on private channels between two
parties, this makes the problem more difficult because a Byzantine agent can give conflicting information to different
honest agents on different private channels. In Section 5 we show how to adapt our algorithm to deal with private
communication channels, under a mild synchronization assumption.
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The adversarial multi-armed bandit problem [2,3], discussed above, forms the basis for our work. We have indicated
the ways in which our model generalizes the existing multi-armed bandit model to the setting of collaborative learning
with dishonest users. Our work is also related to several other topics which we now discuss.
1.2.1. Collaborative filtering—spectral methods
Our problem is similar, at least in terms of motivation, to the problem of designing collaborative filtering or recom-
mendation systems. In such problems, one has a community of users selecting products and giving feedback on their
evaluations of these products. The goal is to use this feedback to make recommendations to users, guiding them to
subsequently select products which they are likely to evaluate positively. Theoretical work on collaborative filtering
has mostly dealt with centralized algorithms for such problems. Typically, theoretical solutions have been considered
for specific (e.g., stochastic) input models [8,12–14,21]. In such work, the goal is typically to reconstruct the full
matrix of user preferences based on a small set of potentially noisy samples. This is often achieved using spectral
methods. In contrast, we consider a general, i.e. adversarial, input model. Matrix reconstruction techniques do not
suffice in our model. They are vulnerable to manipulation by dishonest users, as was observed in [6,7]. Dishonest
users may disrupt the low rank assumption which is crucial in matrix reconstruction approaches. Alternatively, they
may report phony data so as to perturb the singular vectors of the matrix, directing all the agents to a particularly bad
resource.
In contrast, our algorithm makes recommendations which are provably good even in the face of arbitrary malicious
attacks by dishonest users. To obtain this stronger guarantee, we must make a stronger assumption about the users:
honest users are assumed to behave like automata who always follow the recommendations provided by the algorithm.
(The work on collaborative filtering cited above generally assumes that users will choose whatever resources they like;
the algorithm’s role is limited to that of a passive observer, taking note of the ratings supplied by users and making
recommendations based on this data.)
1.2.2. Collaborative filtering—random sampling methods
The only previous collaborative filtering algorithm designed to tolerate Byzantine behavior is the “Random Advice
Random Sample” algorithm in [6,7]; its average regret per user is O(k logn). The model in [6] deals with the static
case, in which bad resources are consistently bad and good resources are consistently good; the only changes in
the operating environment over time occur when resources arrive or depart. The algorithm in [6] uses the notion of
“recommendation”: once an agent finds a good resource, it sticks to it forever and recommends it to others. As time
elapses, progressively more agents stick with the good advice. The bounds on regret and convergence time in [6]
are analogous to ours, and are in fact superior to those in our Theorem 2.1 because the regret is independent of the
number of trials. However, [6] does not handle costs which evolve dynamically as a function of time, and is limited to
{0,1}-valued rather than real-valued costs.
A related pair of papers [1,4] use random sampling methods to design algorithms for the problem of approximately
reconstructing the entire cost matrix, again assuming costs are {0,1}-valued and do not change over time. These
algorithms have polylogarithmic convergence time provided that the set of honest agents can be partitioned into
subsets, each containing a constant fraction of the agents who are weakly consistent, in the sense that their cost
vectors have small Hamming distance from each other.
1.2.3. Reputation management in P2P networks
Kamvar et al. [16] proposed an algorithm, dubbed EigenTrust, for the problem of locating resources in peer-to-peer
networks. In this problem, users of a peer-to-peer network wish to select other peers from whom to download files, with
the aim of minimizing the number of downloads of inauthentic files by honest users; the problem is made difficult by
the presence of malicious peers who may attempt to undermine the algorithm. Like our algorithm, EigenTrust defines
reputation scores using a random walk on the set of agents, with time-varying transition probabilities which are
updated according to the agents’ observations. Unlike our algorithm, EigenTrust uses a different rule for updating the
transition probabilities, and they demonstrate the algorithm’s robustness against a limited set of malicious exploits, as
opposed to the arbitrary adversarial behavior against which our algorithm is provably robust. The problem considered
here is less general than the peer-to-peer resource location problem considered in [16]; for instance, we assume that
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(namely, those peers who claim to have a copy of the requested file). Despite these differences, we believe that our
work may shed light on the efficacy of EigenTrust while suggesting potential enhancements to make it more robust
against Byzantine malicious users.
2. Statement of the problem and the results
Our algorithm operates in an environment consisting of a set X of n agents and a set Y of m resources. A subset
H ⊆ X is composed of honest agents, and the rest are dishonest. Honest agents are assumed to obey the distributed
protocol to be specified, and to report their observations truthfully, while dishonest agents may behave in a Byzantine
manner, disobeying the protocol or reporting fictitious observations as they wish. We will assume throughout that the
number of honest agents is at least αn, where α > 0 is a parameter which may be arbitrarily small. The agents do not
initially know which ones are honest and which are dishonest, nor are they assumed to know the value of α.
In each of T consecutive rounds, a cost function ct : X×Y → [0,1] is given. We think of the cost ct (x, y) as agent
x’s perception of the cost of resource y at time t . The costs may be set by an adaptive adversary who is allowed to
choose ct based on the agents’ actions in rounds 1, . . . , t − 1 but not on their random decisions in the present or future
rounds; the adversary may also use randomization in determining ct . Define two agents x1, x2 to be consistent if for
all y ∈ Y , t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, the costs ct (x1, y), ct (x2, y) are random variables with the same expected value, conditional
on the choices of the adversary and all agents in all rounds preceding t .3 We will assume that the honest agents may
be partitioned into k coalitions, such that two agents belonging to the same coalition are consistent; the honest agents
do not initially know which coalitions the other honest agents belong to.
At the beginning of each round, each agent x ∈ X must choose a resource y = yt (x) ∈ Y . Any agent is allowed
to choose any resource in any round. The cost of the choice is ct (x, y), and this cost (but not the cost of any other
resource) is revealed to x. The agents may communicate with each other between rounds, and this communication may
influence their decisions in future rounds. To simplify the exposition we will assume throughout most of the paper that
all messages are exchanged using a shared public channel. In any round t all agents (including the Byzantine dishonest
agents) must commit to their message on this channel before being able to read the messages posted by other agents in
round t . This public-channel assumption is for expositional clarity only: in Section 5 we will indicate how to achieve
the same results (with slightly worse bounds) in a message-passing model where agents may only exchange messages
bilaterally on point-to-point communication links, subject to the assumption that all agents can synchronize clocks
and that they have enough time to perform Ω(logn) communication rounds in between consecutive decision rounds.
(The Byzantine agents may eavesdrop on all such communications, whereas honest agents may not eavesdrop on any
message if they are not the sender or receiver.) As might be expected, some subtleties arise in the message-passing
model, due to ability of the Byzantine nodes to give differing advice to different parties, and to eavesdrop on others’
messages.
The goal of the algorithm is to minimize the total cost incurred by honest agents. As is typical with online decision
problems, we will evaluate the algorithm’s performance by measuring the difference between the algorithm’s expected
total cost and the minimum expected cost that can be achieved by choosing a fixed resource for each agent, and
instructing that agent to select this resource every time. This parameter is called regret4 and will be denoted by R,
R = E
[∑
x∈H
T∑
t=1
ct
(
x, yt (x)
)]− min
y:H→Y E
[∑
x∈H
T∑
t=1
ct
(
x, y(x)
)]
. (1)
The following two parameters, closely related to R, are also of interest:
• The normalized individual regret Rˆ = R/αnT is the regret per unit time of the average honest agent. For all of
the algorithms we will consider, Rˆ converges to zero as T → ∞.
3 The randomness of the variables ct (x1, y), ct (x2, y), conditional on the history preceding t , is due to the adversary’s potential use of randomness
in determining ct .
4 An even stronger notion of regret would compare the algorithm’s cost with the expectation of the minimum cost of a fixed mapping from agents
to resources, rather than using the minimum of the expected cost of such a mapping. In this paper we consider only the weaker notion of regret.
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to guarantee that Rˆ = O(δ). Here, δ is a positive constant which may be arbitrarily close to zero.
2.1. Our results
We present a distributed algorithm, named TrustFilter, in Section 3. Let β = 1 +m/n.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose the set of honest agents may be partitioned into k subsets S1, S2, . . . , Sk , such that the agents
in each subset are mutually consistent. Then the normalized regret Rˆ and δ-convergence time τ(δ) of TrustFilter satisfy
Rˆ = O
((
β
α
)
k log(n) log(T )T −1/3
)
, (2)
τ(δ) = O
((
β
αδ
)3
k3 log3(n) log3
(
βk logn
αδ
))
. (3)
The δ-convergence time bound follows from the regret bound. Typically we are interested in the case where
α,β, δ, k are constants, hence we will summarize this result by saying that the algorithm has polylogarithmic con-
vergence time.
3. The algorithm TrustFilter
3.1. Intuition
As stated in the introduction, our algorithm is based on a Markov chain representing a random walk in a directed
graph, whose vertices represent the set of resources and agents. We refer to this directed graph as the “reputation
network.” At each time, each agent picks an outgoing edge in the reputation network with appropriate probability, and
then traverses this edge. If the edge leads to a resource, this resource is selected for sampling. Else, if the edge leads
to another agent, advice is sought from that agent, who forwards the request for advice along a random edge of the
reputation network (again chosen according to the current transition probabilities of the random walk) and so on until
the random-walk path reaches a resource which the original agent selects for sampling. Depending on the observed
cost of the sampled resource, the agent updates its transition probabilities in a manner to be specified later.
As an aid in developing intuition, consider the special case when the costs of resources are {0,1}-valued and do not
change over time. Hence, the objective of every agent is simply to find a resource with cost 0, if one exists, and then
to use this resource for all subsequent trials. In this special case let us make the additional simplifying assumption
that the values of α,β, δ are known to the algorithm designer. One may then use an algorithm in which the Markov
chain is based on a random graph and the transition probabilities are updated according to a particularly simple rule.
Specifically, at initialization time, each agent picks at random a small subset of the other agents and a small subset of
the resources, takes their union, and sets equal transition probabilities on all outgoing edges leading to members of
this set. (The word “small” in the foregoing sentence should be interpreted to mean “independent of n, and depending
only polynomially on α−1, β, δ−1.”) All other outgoing edge probabilities are zero. Assume that agents adopt the
following simple rule for updating their transition probabilities: if an agent chooses an outgoing edge and ends up
selecting a resource with cost 0, it assigns probability 1 permanently to that resource and probability 0 to all other
edges; otherwise it leaves the transition probabilities unchanged. This algorithm can be viewed as an alternative to the
Random Advice Random Sample algorithm in [7], and it achieves logarithmic convergence time. The analysis of the
algorithm is based on the observation that with high probability, almost all of the honest agents are contained in a giant
strongly connected component of the reputation network with logarithmic diameter, and that good advice propagates
through the reputation network at constant speed. Since we are interested in exploring the algorithm only as an aid in
developing intuition for the more difficult case of time-varying costs, we will only sketch the proof. From the theory
of random graphs, we know that when we restrict the reputation network to the honest agents, with high probability
the induced subgraph has a “giant” strongly connected component S, containing all but an arbitrarily small constant
fraction of the honest agents, in which every node can reach every other node using a path of length O(logn). With
high probability there is an edge in the reputation network from some agent x0 ∈ S to a resource with cost 0 (assuming
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stumble on another zero-cost resource by following the advice of others. Now we may argue that every other agent in
S finds a resource with cost 0 in time O(logn). Indeed, if there is a path of length L, x = xL → xL−1 → ·· · → x0,
from x to x0 in S, then we may prove by induction on L that x will find a zero-cost resource in O(L) steps. Indeed,
once xL−1 has found a zero-cost resource, only a constant number of steps are required (in expectation) before x
either asks xL−1 for advice or follows some other advice to discover a zero-cost resource.
Our algorithm for the case of dynamic costs looks quite different from the algorithm for static costs presented
in the preceding paragraph, but it is based on the same intuition: by structuring the reputation network as a random
graph, good advice will propagate among honest agents at sufficient speed for the vast majority of them to identify
the lowest-cost resource in logarithmic time. The main technical difference is that agents must update their transition
probabilities using the multi-armed bandit algorithm, rather than shifting all of their probability mass to one outgoing
edge as soon as they discover a resource with zero cost. This modification is necessary in order to deal with the fact
that a resource which has zero cost at one time may not have zero cost at future times. More subtly, when agents
are using the multi-armed bandit algorithm to update their transition probabilities, they must use an anytime bandit
algorithm as defined in Section 3.2.5 This is because the agents do not know how many other honest agents belong
to their coalition, so they must consider all other vertices of the reputation network as potential neighbors to avoid
being cut off from the lowest-cost resource by a ring of dishonest peers. Classical multi-armed bandit algorithms
(e.g. [2,3]) will have a regret of Ω(√βnT ) in such a scenario, whereas we seek an algorithm whose regret depends
polylogarithmically on n when the coalition size is Ω(βn). Accordingly, we use an anytime bandit algorithm ABA
whose salient feature is that it satisfies a significantly better bound on regret when nearly-optimal strategies constitute
a large fraction of all strategies. (The usage of the word anytime here parallels the use of the term anytime algorithm in
the artificial intelligence literature, e.g. [9,26], to refer to optimization algorithms which generate imprecise answers
quickly and proceed to construct progressively better approximate solutions over time, eventually converging to the
optimal solution.)
3.2. The anytime bandit algorithm
The anytime bandit algorithm [18] is a multi-armed bandit algorithm with strategy set N, the set of natural num-
bers.6 By this, we mean that the algorithm outputs, in each time step t , a finitely-supported probability distribution πt
on N—based only on the inputs observed at times preceding t—and that its input at the end of step t is an ordered pair
(i, c) where i is a random sample from πt and c ∈ [0,1] is interpreted as the algorithm’s cost for choosing i at time t .
(We assume here that this cost is specified by an adaptive adversary who defines a cost function ct : N → [0,1] in
each step.) The algorithm’s objective is the same as that of the usual multi-armed bandit algorithm: to use the feedback
from past trials to tune its probability distribution so that it becomes concentrated on the strategies with the lowest
average cost. Since there are infinitely many strategies, it cannot accomplish this goal in a finite amount of time. In-
stead, the algorithm starts by trying to do nearly as well as the lowest-numbered strategies, and competes against the
higher-numbered strategies only as time progresses. Thus, if the algorithm is stopped at any finite time T , one finds
that the average cost of its choices in steps 1,2, . . . , T is nearly as good as the average cost of the best strategy in
some initial segment {1,2, . . . , j} ⊂ N, and the value of j tends to infinity with T .
Using the multi-armed bandit algorithm Exp3 of [2,3] as a subroutine, it is easy to describe the anytime algorithm
ABA. For each k  0, at time 8k , it initializes an instance of Exp3 with strategy set {1,2, . . . ,2k}. From time 8k to
8k+1 − 1, it uses this instance of Exp3 to define a probability distribution on N supported on the subset {1,2, . . . ,2k},
and this is the distribution πt which ABA outputs in step t . In each trial a strategy it is sampled from πt , the cost ct (it )
is revealed by the adversary, and this feedback is reported back to Exp3.
The performance of ABA is characterized by the following theorem. We refer the reader to [18] for a simple proof
of the theorem, which is listed as Corollary 4.3 in that paper.
5 Anytime bandit algorithms were first defined in [18]. The algorithm is explained in Section 3.2 for the purpose of making our exposition
self-contained.
6 For the application in this paper, it would have been possible to use an anytime bandit algorithm with a finite strategy set, namely X ∪ Y , but
we will work with the infinite strategy set N—mapping its elements to the finite set X∪Y via a many-to-one correspondence—in order to keep our
terminology consistent with [18].
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ABA satisfies the following bound, in which it denotes a random sample from the distribution πt defined by ABA:
E
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
ct (it )− ct (j)
)]= O(j log(T )T −1/3). (4)
It is illuminating to compare this regret bound with the regret of the algorithm Exp3, which runs as a subroutine
inside ABA. The normalized regret of Exp3 is O(
√
m logm/T ) where m is the number of elements in the algorithm’s
strategy set. Thus, ignoring the dependence on j or m, the regret of Exp3 is O(T −1/2) while the regret of ABA is
O˜(T −1/3). This difference is explained by the fact that at time T = 8k , the size of the strategy set used by ABA is
m = 2k = T 1/3. Hence, when evaluating the regret of the version of Exp3 running inside ABA at time T , we find that
it is
O
(√
m logm
T
)
= O
(√
T 1/3 log(T 1/3)
T
)
= O˜(T −1/3).
See Corollary 4.1 of [18] for alternate versions of the anytime bandit algorithm whose regret achieves a superior
dependence on T at the cost of an inferior dependence on j . In fact, the exponent of T in the regret bound can be
made arbitrarily close to −1/2 while retaining polynomial dependence on j , though the exponent of j tends to infinity
as the exponent of T tends to −1/2. The version considered here, with regret depending linearly on j , is particularly
convenient for our purposes because it dovetails cleanly with the random graph analysis conducted in Section 4.
For the analysis of TrustFilter in Section 3.5, it is necessary to extend the analysis of ABA to a more general feedback
model which we call the “noisy feedback model.” This generalization is described as follows. In each round t , instead
of specifying one random cost function ct , the adversary specifies two random cost functions ct , c′t satisfying
∀i ∈ N, E[c′t (i) ∣∣F<t]= E[ct (i) ∣∣F<t ],
where F<t denotes the σ -field generated by all random variables revealed by the algorithm and adversary prior to
time t . Rather than receiving ct (it ) as feedback, the algorithm’s feedback is c′t (it ). However, the cost charged to the
algorithm is still ct (it ). The following easy proposition demonstrates that the regret of ABA is unaffected by the noisy
feedback.
Proposition 3.2. In the noisy feedback model, the regret experienced by algorithm ABA relative to strategy j still
satisfies
E
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
ct (it )− ct (j)
)]= O(j log(T )T −1/3).
Proof. Applying Theorem 3.1 to the sequence of cost functions c′1, c′2, . . . , c′T , gives that
E
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
c′t (it )− c′t (j )
)]= O(j log(T )/T 1/3).
To finish proving the proposition, it suffices to prove that
E
[
T∑
t=1
(
c′t (j )− ct (j)
)]= 0
and
E
[
T∑
t=1
(
c′t (it ) − ct (it )
)]= 0.
These follow from the fact that E(c′t (i)) = E(ct (i)) and E(c′t (it )) = E(ct (it )), both of which are consequences of the
equation
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[
ct (k)
∣∣ it ,F<t]= E[c′t (k) ∣∣ it ,F<t ],
which holds for all k ∈ N because it is conditionally independent of the pair (ct , c′t ) given F<t . 
We conclude this section with a simple observation about ABA which will be needed later.
Lemma 3.3. For every positive integer t , the distribution πt which ABA outputs in step t satisfies πt (1) > 0.
Proof. The lemma follows immediately from the fact that Exp3 always assigns positive probability to each of its
strategies, and the instance of Exp3 running inside ABA always has strategy set {1,2, . . . ,2k} for some k  0. 
3.3. The algorithm TrustFilter
Here we present the algorithm TrustFilter, using ABA as a subroutine. Let y0 be an arbitrary element of Y . When
TrustFilter is initialized, each agent x initializes an instance ABA(x) of the anytime bandit algorithm, and it chooses
a random function gx : N → X ∪ Y , such that gx(1) = y0 and the values gx(i) for i  2 are independent uniformly-
distributed elements of X ∪ Y . We may consider the strategy set N of ABA(x) as comprising many “virtual copies”
of each strategy s ∈ X ∪ Y : the decision of ABA(x) to play strategy i corresponds, in TrustFilter, to a decision by
agent x to play strategy gx(i). (The initialization step, as described above, requires the algorithm to make an infinite
number of random choices at start-up time, which obviously is impossible in practice. In an actual implementation,
the same result can be accomplished by lazy evaluation, i.e. the value of gx(i) is undefined until the algorithm reaches
a step which requires it to examine the value of gx(i). At that moment, if i > 1, gx(i) is initialized to be a uniformly-
distributed random sample from X ∪ Y , drawn independently of previous random choices. If i = 1 then gx(i) is
initialized to be y0.)
At the beginning of each round t , each agent x queries its local bandit algorithm ABA(x) to obtain a probability
distribution πt (x) on a finite subset of N; this defines a probability distribution μt(x) on X ∪ Y , according to the rule
that
μt(x, s) =
∑
i∈g−1x (s)
πt (x, i).
Here μt(x, s) denotes the probability assigned by μt(x) to any s ∈ X ∪ Y , and similarly for πt (x, i) when i ∈ N. If
agent x is an honest agent, it posts this distribution μt(x) on the public channel. Of course, if x is a Byzantine agent,
it may announce an arbitrary distribution rather than using the one which would be supplied by ABA(x). For all x ∈ X
let νt (x) denote the distribution which x chooses to post on the public channel. Lemma 3.3 ensures that νt (x, y0) > 0
for all honest agents x. Accordingly, if we define pt (x) to be equal to νt (x) if νt (x, y0) > 0 and otherwise to be a
distribution which assigns probability 1 to y0, then we have the following properties:
(1) The distribution pt(x) is common knowledge to all agents at time t .
(2) For all x ∈ X, pt(x, y0) > 0.
(3) If x is an honest agent, then pt (x) = νt (x) = μt(x).
The distributions pt(x) determine a Markov chain with state space X∪Y , in which the elements of Y are absorbing
states and each element x ∈ X has transition probabilities governed by the distribution pt (x). A sample path of this
Markov chain, starting from a state x ∈ X, can be described as a realization of the following stochastic process:
x generates a request for advice and sends it to a random neighbor sampled according to pt(x). If the random neighbor
is an element y ∈ Y , the advice request stays at y; if it is an element x′ ∈ X, then x′ forwards the advice request to one
of its neighbors sampled from the distribution pt (x′), and the process continues recursively. In Section 3.4 below, we
prove that with probability 1, the process is absorbed at an element y ∈ Y . Letting qt (x, y) denote the probability that
the random walk starting from x is absorbed at y, we will also prove that there is an efficient algorithm to compute
qt (x, y), given the transition probabilities of the Markov chain (which can easily be computed from the contents of
the public channel at time t).
1280 B. Awerbuch, R. Kleinberg / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 74 (2008) 1271–1288To select a resource y = yt (x) ∈ Y , x samples a number it ∈ N from the distribution πt (x) and puts s = gx(it ).
It then samples a resource y randomly using the probability distribution qt (s), i.e. the distribution which assigns
probability qt (s, y) to each element y ∈ Y . It learns the cost ct (y), and returns the feedback (it , ct (y)) to ABA(x).
3.4. Analysis of the Markov chain
As explained above, the behavior of the algorithm TrustFilter at time t is governed by a Markov chain with state
space X∪Y , in which every state in Y is an absorbing state, and the transition probability from any state x ∈ X to any
state s ∈ X ∪ Y is equal to pt (x, s). If we define
pt(y, s) =
{1 if s = y,
0 otherwise
for all y ∈ Y , s ∈ X ∪ Y , then the transition matrix of this Markov chain is a matrix Mt whose rows and columns are
indexed by the elements of X ∪ Y , and whose entries are given by (Mt)rs = pt (r, s). We say that a sequence of states
s1, s2, . . . is absorbed at a state s if there exists some integer r0 > 0 such that sr = s for all r > r0.
Lemma 3.4. If s1, s2, . . . is a sample path of the Markov chain Mt , then with probability 1 the sample path is absorbed
at an element of Y .
Proof. If sr0 = y ∈ Y then sr = y for all r > r0 because y is an absorbing state of Mt . Hence the lemma is equivalent
to the assertion that the sample path contains an element of Y with probability 1. Recall that the transition probabilities
pt were defined so that pt (x, y0) > 0 for all x ∈ X. Letting εt = minx∈X pt (x, y0), we find that Pr({s1, s2, . . . , sr} ⊆
X) (1− εt )r−1. As εt > 0, this establishes that the expected number of state transitions that take place before hitting
Y is finite. By the First Borel–Cantelli lemma, it follows that with probability 1 the sample path eventually hits Y . 
Recall from Section 3.3 that for any state s ∈ X ∪ Y , we define qt (s, y) to be the probability that a sample path of
Mt is absorbed at y, conditional on the sample path starting at s. Lemma 3.4 ensures that for all s,
∑
y∈Y qt (s, y) = 1.
Hence qt (s) is a well-defined probability distribution on Y . The remainder of this section describes a formula for
computing qt (s) algebraically.
Let Qt denote the matrix whose rows are indexed by X ∪ Y , whose columns are indexed by Y , and whose entries
are given by the formula (Qt )sy = qt (s, y).
Lemma 3.5. MtQt = Qt .
Proof. Let s1, s2, . . . denote a sample path of the Markov chain Mt . Let the notation s1, s2, . . . → y denote the event
that s1, s2, . . . is absorbed at y. For any s ∈ X ∪ Y,y ∈ Y we have
(Qt )sy = qt (s, y)
= Pr(s1, s2, . . . → y | s1 = s)
=
∑
r∈X∪Y
Pr(s2 = r | s1 = s)Pr(s1, s2, . . . → y | s1 = s, s2 = r)
=
∑
r∈X∪Y
pt (s, r)qt (r, y)
=
∑
r∈X∪Y
(Mt)sr (Qt )ry
= (MtQt)sy . 
We pause here to make an observation which will be useful later.
Corollary 3.6. For any x ∈ H ,∑∑
πt (x, i)qt
(
gx(i), y
)
ct (x, y) =
∑
qt (x, y)ct (x, y).y∈Y i∈N y∈Y
B. Awerbuch, R. Kleinberg / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 74 (2008) 1271–1288 1281Proof. We can write the left side as∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈X∪Y
∑
i∈g−1x (s)
πt (x, i)qt (s, y)ct (x, y).
Recalling that
∑
i∈g−1x (s) πt (x, i) = μt(x, i) and that μt(x) = pt(x) because x ∈ H , we see that the expression above
is equal to∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈X∪Y
pt (x, s)qt (s, y)ct (x, y) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈X∪Y
(Mt)xs(Qt )syct (x, y) =
∑
y∈Y
(MtQt)xyct (x, y)
=
∑
y∈Y
(Qt )xyct (x, y) =
∑
y∈Y
qt (x, y)ct (x, y),
as claimed. 
For any matrix L with rows indexed by a set I and columns indexed by a set J , if U ⊆ I and V ⊆ J are any
subsets of the rows and columns, let us use the notation L[U,V ] to denote the submatrix of L consisting of all entries
belonging to a row and column whose indices are in U and V , respectively. Define
A = Qt [X,Y ],
B = Mt [X,X],
C = Mt [X,Y ],
so that we have
Mt =
(
B C
0 I
)
, Qt =
(
A
I
)
, (5)
where I denotes the m-by-m identity matrix and 0 denotes the zero matrix. The problem of computing Q is equivalent
to the problem of computing A. From (5) we have
MtQt =
(
BA +C
I
)
,
which together with Lemma 3.5 implies
BA +C = A,
(I − B)A = C.
The following lemma allows us to deduce that A = (I − B)−1C, which completes our description of the formula for
computing the distributions qt (s).
Lemma 3.7. The matrix I −B is invertible.
Proof. For any x ∈ X, let Bx denote the xth row of B , i.e. the row vector whose zth component is pt(x, z). Observe
that
‖Bx‖1 =
∑
z∈X
pt (x, z)
( ∑
s∈X∪Y
pt (x, s)
)
− pt (x, y0) < 1.
For any non-zero vector v we have
‖Bv‖∞ = max
x
|Bxv|max
x
‖Bx‖1‖v‖∞ < ‖v‖∞,
hence Bv = v. This implies that (I − B)v = 0 whenever v = 0, hence I − B is invertible. 
1282 B. Awerbuch, R. Kleinberg / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 74 (2008) 1271–12883.5. Analysis of the algorithm TrustFilter
In this section we analyze the algorithm TrustFilter, thereby proving Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let F<t be the σ -field generated by the random variables{
gx(i): x ∈ X, i ∈ N
}∪ {yu(x): x ∈ X, u < t}∪ {cu(y): y ∈ Y, u < t},
i.e. the entire history preceding round t . In particular, F<1 denotes the σ -field generated by the random variables
{gx(i): x ∈ X, i ∈ N}. For x ∈ X, s ∈ X ∪ Y , let
c˜t (x, s) =
∑
y∈Y
qt (s, y)E
[
ct (x, y)
∣∣F<t ].
From the standpoint of agent x, the bandit algorithm ABA(x) is running in the noisy feedback model with cost func-
tions Ct(i) = c˜t (x, gx(i)) and random feedback variables C′t (i) distributed according to the cost ct (x, y) of a random
resource y ∈ Y sampled according to qt (gx(i)). For u ∈ H , v ∈ X ∪ Y , let
(u, v) = min{i ∈ N: gu(i) = v}. (6)
It follows from Proposition 3.2 that for each u ∈ H and v ∈ X ∪ Y ,
1
T
E
[
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈N
πt (u, i)c˜t
(
u,gu(i)
)− T∑
t=1
c˜t (u, v)
∣∣∣F<1
]
= O((u, v) log(T )T −1/3). (7)
Furthermore, applying Corollary 3.6 we have∑
i∈N
πt (u, i)c˜t
(
u,gu(i)
)= E[∑
i∈N
∑
y∈Y
πt (u, i)qt
(
gu(i), y
)
ct (u, y)
∣∣∣F<t]= E[∑
y∈Y
qt (u, y)ct (u, y)
∣∣∣F<t]
= E[c˜t (u,u) ∣∣F<t].
Hence we may rewrite (7) as
1
T
E
[
T∑
t=1
(
c˜t (u,u) − c˜t (u, v)
) ∣∣∣F<1
]
= O((u, v) log(T )T −1/3). (8)
Recall that two agents u,x ∈ H are called consistent if E[ct (u, y) | F<t ] = E[ct (x, y) | F<t ] for all t, y. Thus,
when u,x ∈ H are consistent, c˜(u, s) = c˜(x, s) for all s ∈ X ∪ Y . It follows that we may rewrite Eq. (8) as
E
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
c˜t (x, u) − c˜t (x, v)
) ∣∣∣F<1
]
= O((u, v) log(T )T −1/3), (9)
provided that x and u are consistent elements of H . Let S ⊆ H be a consistent coalition containing x. For u ∈ S, let
c¯(u) = E
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
c˜t (x, u)
∣∣∣F<1
)
.
Then (9) may be rewritten as
c¯(u)− c¯(v) = (u, v) ·O(log(T )T −1/3). (10)
Note that for a resource y ∈ Y ,
c¯(y) = E
(
1
T
T∑
ct (x, y)
∣∣∣F<1
)
,t=1
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sampled during the initialization of the algorithm. Also,
c¯(x) = E
(
T∑
t=1
ct
(
x, yt (x)
) ∣∣∣F<1
)
,
i.e. c¯(x) is the conditional expectation of the average cost of the resources sampled by x. Let y∗ denote a resource
with minimum expected cost for members of S. If x and y∗ are joined by a directed path x = u0, u1, u2, . . . , uj = y∗
in S ∪ Y , we may sum up the bounds (10) over the edges of this path to obtain
c¯(x)− c¯(y∗) =
j∑
i=1
(
c¯(ui−1)− c¯(ui)
)= j∑
i=1
(ui−1, ui) · O
(
log(T )T −1/3
)
. (11)
Letting d(x, y∗) denote the length of the shortest path from x to y∗ in the directed graph with vertex set S ∪ Y and
edge lengths given by (·,·), we may rewrite (11) as
c¯(x)− c¯(y∗) = d(x, y∗) · O(log(T )T −1/3). (12)
Observe that the left side is the expected normalized regret of agent x, conditioned on F<1. The random edge lengths
(u, v) on the m + n outgoing edges of u are derived from the random function gu : N → X ∪ Y using the for-
mula (6). For graphs with random edge lengths specified according to this distribution, we analyze the expected
distance between two given vertices in Section 4. Applying Proposition 4.1 from that section, we may conclude that
the expectation of the right side of (12) is O((β/α(S)) log(α(S)n) log(T )T −1/3), where α(S) denotes the ratio |S|/n.
It follows that the normalized regret and δ-convergence time for agents in the coalition S satisfy
Rˆ = O
((
β
α(S)
)
log(α(S)n) log(T )
T 1/3
)
, (13)
τ(δ) = O˜
((
β
α(S)δ
)3
log3
(
α(S)n
)
log3
(
β logn
α(S)δ
))
. (14)
Note that (14) can be interpreted as saying that the large consistent coalitions learn to approximate the cost of the
best resource much more rapidly than do the small coalitions, which accords with one’s intuition about collaborative
learning. To obtain Theorem 2.1, we must average over the k consistent coalitions S1, . . . , Sk . We may multiply the
regret bound for a coalition S in (13) by the size of S, to obtain an upper bound of O(βn logn log(T )T −1/3) on the
sum of the normalized regret of all users in S. Summing over k such coalitions, the cumulative normalized regret of
all honest users is O(kβn logn log(T )T −1/3), so the average individual normalized regret and the convergence time
satisfy:
Rˆ = O
(
k ·
(
β
α
)
log(n) log(T )
T 1/3
)
, (15)
τ(δ) = O˜
(
k3 ·
(
β
αδ
)3
log3(n) log3
(
βk logn
αδ
))
.  (16)
4. A random graph lemma
Let G = (V ,E) denote the directed graph with vertex set V = X ∪ Y , in which each x ∈ X has outgoing edges
to every element of V (including a self-loop to itself), and each y ∈ Y has no outgoing edges. Suppose |X| = n and
|V | = βn. Let X0 ⊆ X be any subset consisting of at least αn elements, and let y0 be an arbitrary element of Y .
For each x ∈ X, sample a random function gx : N → V by putting gx(1) = y0 and, for all i > 1, letting gx(i) be
independent uniformly-distributed elements of V . Define an edge length (u, v) for each directed edge (u, v) by
specifying that
(u, v) = min{i ∈ N: gu(i) = v}.
Note that (u, v) is well defined with probability 1, since Pr(i gu(i) = v) = 0.
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O((β/α) log(αn)).
Proof. The fact that gv(1) = y0 for every v is a nuisance in the proof, so we begin by adopting a trick to circumvent
this nuisance. For each edge e = (u, v) define the modified length of e to be the number λ(u, v) = (u, v) − 1. Let
G0 be the induced subgraph on the vertex set X0 ∪ Y . For u,v ∈ X0 ∪ Y let d(u, v) (respectively δ(u, v)) denote
the minimum total length (respectively modified length) of a path in G0 from u to v. Note that (u, v)  2λ(u, v)
except when (u, v) = 1, and the case (u, v) = 1 occurs only when v = y0, in which case v has no outgoing edges.
It follows that for every path P , (P ) 2λ(P ) + 1; here (P ) and λ(P ) denote the length and modified length of P ,
respectively. Hence, to prove the proposition, it suffices to put an upper bound on E(δ(x, y)).
For an integer r  0, let B0(x, r) denote the set of all v ∈ X0 such that δ(x, v) r . Let b(r) denote the number of
vertices in B0(x, r) and let
r∗ = min{r: b(r) αn/3}.
We will prove separate bounds on the expected values of r∗ and δ(x, y) − r∗. To bound the expected value of r∗, we
make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. For all r  0,
E
[
ln
(
b(r)
)− ln(b(r − 1)) ∣∣ b(r − 1)] α
6β
1[b(r−1)αn/3],
where 1[E] denotes the indicator random variable of an event E .
Proof. Let us assume that b(r − 1) αn/3, as otherwise the lemma is trivial. In that case, for each v ∈ B0(x, r − 1)
let iv = 1 + r − δ(x, v), and let w(v) = gv(iv). We have λ(v,w(v)) r − δ(x, v), which implies
δ
(
x,w(v)
)
 δ(x, v)+ λ(v,w(v)) r.
Hence w(v) ∈ B0(x, r). We will prove that in expectation, at least α3β b(r − 1) of the vertices w(v) belong to X0 \
B0(x, r − 1). Label the elements of B0(x, r − 1) as v1, v2, . . . , vb(r−1). For 1 j  b(r − 1), let
Sj = B0(x, r − 1)∪
(
X0 ∩
{
w(v1),w(v2), . . . ,w(vj )
})
.
Note that |Sj | 2b(r − 1) 2αn/3 for all j , so X0 always contains at least αn/3 elements which are not in Sj . The
following bound holds for all j :
Pr
(
w(vj ) ∈ X0 \ Sj−1
∣∣ Sj−1) α3β . (17)
This is because w(vj ) is uniformly distributed among the βn elements of the set X∪Y , at least αn/3 of which belong
to X0 \ Sj−1, and the random variables w(vj ), Sj−1 are independent. Summing (17) for j = 1,2, . . . , b(r − 1), we
find that the expected number of elements of Sb(r−1) \ B0(x, r − 1), conditional on the event b0(r − 1) αn/3, is at
least α3β b(r − 1). Since Sb(r−1) ⊆ B0(x, r) we have |Sb(r−1)| b(r). Note also that |Sb(r−1)| 2b(r − 1). Combining
all these bounds, we obtain
E
(
min
{
b(r)
b(r − 1) ,2
} ∣∣∣ b(r − 1)) E( |Sb(r−1)|
b(r − 1)
∣∣∣ b(r − 1)) 1 + α3β 1b(r−1)αn/3.
Let y = min{ b(r)
b(r−1) ,2}. Using the identity ln(x) x−1x  x−12 which is valid for all 1 x  2, we find that
E
(
ln
(
b(r)
b(r − 1)
) ∣∣∣ b(r − 1)) E(min{ln( b(r)
b(r − 1)
)
, ln(2)
} ∣∣∣ b(r − 1))= E(ln(y) ∣∣ b(r − 1))
 E
(
y − 1
2
∣∣∣ b(r − 1)) α6β 1b(r−1)αn/3. 
Lemma 4.2 implies that
6β
E
(
ln
(
b(r)
)− ln(b(r − 1))) Pr(b(r − 1) αn/3)= Pr(r∗  r). (18)
α
B. Awerbuch, R. Kleinberg / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 74 (2008) 1271–1288 1285Summing (18) for r = 1,2, . . . we find that
6β
α
lim
r→∞ E
(
ln
(
b(r)
))

∞∑
r=1
Pr(r∗  r),
6β
α
ln(αn) E(r∗), (19)
where the last line was derived using the fact that B0(x, r) ⊆ X0—and hence b(r) αn—for all r .
Having established an upper bound on E(r∗), we turn now to the task of bounding E(δ(x, y) − r∗). Let B =
B0(x, r∗). For any v ∈ B and any positive integer a, let wa(v) = gv(1 + r∗ + a − δ(x, y)). As before, observe that
λ(v,wa(v)) r∗ + a − δ(x, v) and consequently,
δ
(
x,wa(v)
)
 δ(x, v)+ λ(v,wa(v)) r∗ + a.
For any positive integer d , the event δ(x, y) − r∗ > d implies that y = wa(v) for all v ∈ B and a  d . Conditional on
the values of r∗ and B , the random variables wa(v) (1  a  d, v ∈ B) are all mutually independent and uniformly
distributed in X ∪ Y . Consequently,
Pr
(
δ(x, y)− r∗ > d ∣∣ r∗,B) d∏
a=1
∏
v∈B
Pr
(
y = wa(v)
)= (1 − 1
βn
)d|B|
. (20)
Summing over d = 0,1,2, . . . , we obtain
E
(
δ(x, y) − r∗ ∣∣ r∗,B) ∞∑
d=0
((
1 − (βn)−1)|B|)d = 1
1 − (1 − (βn)−1)|B| .
Recalling that |B| = b(r∗) αn/3, we have(
1 − (βn)−1)|B|  e−|B|/(βn)  e−α/(3β).
Using the inequality e−x  1 − x2 , which is valid for 0 x  1, we obtain
1 − (1 − (βn)−1)|B|  α
6β
,
which implies
E
(
δ(x, y) − r∗) 6β
α
. (21)
Combining (19) with (21), and recalling that d(x, y) 2δ(x, y)+ 1, we obtain
E
(
d(x, y)
)= O(β
α
log(αn)
)
as desired. 
5. Message-passing implementation of TrustFilter
In formulating the model in Section 2 we assumed the existence of a shared public channel, to which all agents
could post their probability distribution in each decision epoch. It is natural to wonder whether the same outcome
can be achieved in a more distributed communication model. In this section we will assume that each pair of agents
can exchange messages over a private channel. We will assume that every Byzantine agent can eavesdrop on every
channel (even if both parties participating in the channel are honest), i.e. it can read but not modify the messages sent
on such a channel. An honest agent can only read messages on the channels in which it is a participant. We will also
assume that the agents’ clocks are sufficiently synchronized that they can determine a sequence of L = log(n) non-
overlapping time windows in each decision epoch. More precisely, we assume that each honest agent x can define time
windows Wi(x) for 1 i  L, such that if ai(x), bi(x) are the start and end of Wi(x) as measured according to some
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taken over the set of all honest agents.
There is an obvious protocol in this message-passing model which attempts to emulate TrustFilter. Each agent
initiates a request for advice at the beginning of the decision epoch, and this advice is forwarded randomly through the
reputation network using the transition probabilities determined by the state of the ABA at each node, until reaching
a resource, at which point a response is returned to the agent who originated the request for advice. However, the
message-passing model allows the Byzantine nodes to perpetrate sophisticated exploits which are not available in
the public-channel model. For example, they may forward different advice requests according to different transition
probabilities, or even adjust their transition probabilities during the decision epoch after observing which neighbors
forward advice requests to them. Because of adversarial exploits such as these, we are not able to prove that this naive
emulation of TrustFilter is effective.
Instead, we analyze an algorithm based on simulating a directed acyclic graph G with levels 0,1, . . . ,L and a
complete directed bipartite graph joining level i to level i − 1, for 1  i  L. The vertex set in level 0 is identified
with Y , while the vertex set in each positively-numbered level is identified with X. In this way, each agent x is
identified with L nodes x1, x2, . . . , xL of G. The agent instantiates L separate instances of the ABA algorithm, one
for each corresponding node of G. For each such ABA instance, the strategy set N is mapped to the set δout(xi) of
outgoing edges of the corresponding node of G using a random one-to-one correspondence from {1,2, . . . , d} to
δout(xi) combined with an arbitrary constant function from {d + 1, d + 2, . . .} to δout(xi). (Here, d = n for nodes
above level 1, and d = m in level 1.) The random one-to-one correspondence is sampled independently for each of
the nodes x1, x2, . . . , xL. Using a message-passing protocol to be described below, in each decision epoch the nodes
of G will each choose a resource by emulating the algorithm TrustFilter. (This emulation, unlike the one described
above, will not be susceptible to adversarial exploits because the nodes in different levels will be forced to commit
to their decisions during disjoint time windows.) Note that it is not possible for every node of G to receive feedback
on its decision, because each agent x corresponds to L nodes of G which may select different resources in a decision
epoch, whereas x itself is allowed to select only one resource. To address this, x chooses a random level—assigning
probability 1 − δ to level L and δ/(L − 1) to all other levels—and selects the resource y chosen by the instance of
x at that level. The resulting cost is supplied as feedback only to the instances of x which selected y in this decision
epoch; all other instances of x in G receive no feedback.
The message-passing protocol operates as follows. As noted above, each agent x defines L consecutive non-
overlapping time windows Wi(x) during the decision epoch. At the start of Wi(x), the node xi ∈ V (G) chooses
an outgoing edge using its ABA instance. If i = 1, the other endpoint of this edge designates the resource selected
by xi . If i > 1, the other endpoint of this edge corresponds to an agent x′, and x sends a request for advice to this
agent. If x′ responds before the end of time window Wi(x), then x chooses the resource specified in x′’s response.
Otherwise x chooses an arbitrary resource. An honest agent receiving a request for advice during its time window
Wi(x) responds with the resource it chose during window Wi−1(x). A Byzantine agent, of course, responds however
it wants.
The analysis of this algorithm closely parallels the analysis of TrustFilter. The δ-convergence time is slower by a
factor of O(log(n)/δ), corresponding to the fact that most of the nodes of G receive feedback once in every δ/ log(n)
decision epochs (on average) rather than in every decision epoch. Most of the other steps of the analysis are identical
with the analysis of TrustFilter. However, there are two salient differences which illustrate the subtlety of the message-
passing model. The definition of the simulated cost function c˜t (x, s) is clear-cut only if s is a resource or an honest
agent. (In these two cases, c˜t (x, s) = ∑y∈Y qt (s, y)E[ct (x, y) | F<t ] as before.) If s is a Byzantine agent and y
denotes the advice which s would give to x assuming that x sends a request to s, then c˜t (x, s) must be defined
as the expectation of ct (x, y) conditioned on all messages transmitted in all prior decision epochs as well as those
transmitted in the current decision epoch prior to x receiving a response from s. Recall that the analysis of TrustFilter
requires the fact that c˜t (v,w) = c˜t (w,w) when v,w are consistent. Here we must prove something similar: that if
v,w are honest and consistent and (v,w) in an edge of G, then the random variables c˜t (v,w) and c˜t (w,w) have the
same conditional expectation. In the public-channel setting, this statement follows immediately from the definition of
“consistent,” whereas here there is a small subtlety. In order to prove E[c˜t (v,w) | F<t ] = E[c˜t (w,w) | F<t ] in the
private-channel setting, it is necessary that the advice given by Byzantine nodes downstream from w is independent
of the event that v requests advice from w. This explains why it is necessary for G to be a directed acyclic graph,
and why it is necessary for the advice to propagate “backwards” (from the set of resources back to the agents at the
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advice and these progress downwards until reaching a resource node at the bottom level of G.
6. Open problems
In this paper we have introduced and analyzed an algorithm for a simple model of collaborative learning. A key
feature of our model is the presence of a large number of dishonest agents who are assumed to behave in an arbitrary
Byzantine manner. However, other aspects of our model are quite idealized, and there are some very natural extensions
of the model which more closely reflect the reality of collaborative learning systems such as eBay’s reputation system
and peer-to-peer resource discovery systems. It would be desirable to identify algorithms for some of the following
extensions.
(1) This paper was concerned with a synchronous decision-making problem in which each agent must choose one
resource in each decision round. One may instead study the asynchronous case, in which only a subset of the
agents acts as decision-makers in each round and the rest are inactive.
(2) We assumed that any agent could choose any resource at any time. One may instead study cases in which an agent
x is restricted to choose from a subset S(x, t) ⊆ Y at time t . Useful special cases include the case in which S(x, t)
does not depend on t and the case in which it does not depend on x. (In the latter case, it is not even clear how to
formulate the proper notion of “regret.”)
(3) We assumed a very strict consistency condition for two agents x1, x2 in the same coalition: at every time t , for
every resource y, the random variables ct (x1, y), ct (x2, y) should have the same expected value, conditioned on
past history. Consider relaxations of this criterion, for instance:
• |E[ct (x1, y) |F<t ] − E[ct (x2, y) |F<t ]| < ε.
• E[ct (x1, y∗) | F<t ] = E[ct (x2, y∗) | F<t ], where y∗ is the best resource for both x1 and x2. No such equation
is required to hold for other resources y.
• The mixture model: for each t , the functions fx(y) = E[ct (x, y) | F<t ] belong to a k-dimensional linear sub-
space of the vector space of functions Y → R, as x ranges over X.
(4) Study more structured collaborative decision-making problems, e.g. selecting routing paths in a network, some of
whose nodes are identified with the agents.
Finally, it would be desirable to discover non-trivial lower bounds for the convergence time of collaborative learning
algorithms. At present the trivial lower bound of Ω(m/αn)—the minimum number of rounds needed to ensure that
the best resource is sampled by at least one honest agent with constant probability—is essentially the only known
lower bound.
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